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A new era of missiles and fragile geopolitical balances or strategic planning for European security in volatile regions
Speed Read
The withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) in 2019 reopened the door to the proliferation of medium- and long-range land-based missiles.
The 9M729 (also known as SSC-8), a missile developed by Russia, was confirmed as being used on the battlefield in Ukraine in 2025, in clear violation of the framework the INF Treaty aimed to maintain.
This development is redefining European security: the return of intermediate-range missiles makes responses more complex, expands threat zones, and raises new questions for deterrence and collective defense.
In this context, three major strategic choices emerge: strengthen defenses (and risk an arms race), revive dialogue and international control, or accept a new unstable normal.
Readers are invited to ask themselves: what posture should Europe adopt in the face of this transformation?
The INF Treaty, concluded in 1987 between the United States and the USSR, banned all land-based intermediate-range missiles (500–5,500 km) to reduce the risk of a near-instant strike in Europe. In 2019, the United States, accusing Russia of deploying the 9M729 missile in violation of the treaty, withdrew. Since then, Russia has declared that it is no longer bound by its own moratorium on these systems. Today, the war in Ukraine serves as both a testing ground and a strategic message: the confirmed use of Russian intermediate-range missiles against Ukraine shows a paradigm shift.
For Russia, deploying such missiles strengthens strategic leverage: generating fear, uncertainty, and pressure on adversaries and allies.
It forces the West (Europe and the United States) to reposition, develop new capabilities, and potentially spur military innovation—a technological stimulus.
The weakening of old arms frameworks also allows for a redefinition of alliances, NATO’s role, and Europe’s strategic posture.
One of the INF Treaty’s main roles was to reduce the threshold for triggering a nuclear or near-nuclear war in Europe. With its disappearance, this threshold becomes unclear.
Reaction times are reduced: a mobile intermediate-range missile can strike European targets in minutes, complicating anticipation and response.
The proliferation of these missiles risks triggering an arms race, a return to Cold War logic, and weakening international control mechanisms.
For Europe, a strategic gap exists: few defense systems are adapted to these medium-range threats.
Strengthen European defense: develop radars, missile defense systems, and enhance NATO & European cooperation.
Advantage: improves immediate protection.
Disadvantage: very costly, risks escalation and “out-of-control” logic.
Revive arms control and dialogue: pursue a new INF 2.0 agreement including land-, sea-, and air-launched missiles with verification and transparency.
Advantage: potential long-term stabilization.
Disadvantage: geopolitical context is unfavorable; limiting actors (Russia, China, others) is highly complex.
Adopt a pragmatic acceptance posture: acknowledge that the “norm” is changing and adjust national strategies/alliances accordingly without trying to block everything.
Advantage: flexible, realistic.
Disadvantage: risks a dangerous “new normal” with limited control.
Even though Switzerland is not a NATO member, it is directly concerned:
As a Central Alpine European country, it exists on a continent redefined by the threat of intermediate-range missiles.
This raises foreign policy questions: neutrality, bilateral cooperation with neighbors, participation in collective security efforts.
Finally, citizens may see defense spending increase, geopolitical turbulence rise, and the perception of a “safe zone” diminish.
Technological warfare is now also shadow warfare: discreet, fast, versatile missiles and fragile strategic balances. The legacy of Cold War treaties, like the INF Treaty, is eroding, leaving Europe to choose: bend under a new threat, roll up its sleeves to defend itself, or attempt to revive arms control frameworks.
There is no simple solution: strengthen defense without triggering an arms race, revive dialogue without being overtaken, and adapt without passively accepting a dangerous new order. For Europeans—and for Switzerland—the message is clear: it is time to watch the shadow of missiles, not just the flash of the guns.
“Peace is not decreed; it is prepared.”
Knowledge is power.
